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The purpose of this paper is to present a brief overview of
the world's navies, to state some general conclusions concerning US
Navy shortcomings that the author draws from this overview, and
encourage the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) faculty to review
both its academic and research programs to respond to these
changes
.
The new world order that will arise from the continuing
changes in the Soviet Union will result in significant changes in
the expected areas of operations for the US Navy. It is shown
that, if one discounts the Soviet threat, there will be little
challenge to US naval ships on the open oceans. But when the Navy
must operate close to land, such as is the case for naval support
of ground operations (Iraq) , evacuation of US citizens in hostile
situations (Liberia) , amphibious operations (Lebanon) and drug
interdiction, the threat is significant. This threat is often
different from that expected on the open oceans. For example,
battle space is greatly reduced, there can be confusion between
enemy and non-belligerants, operations are in shallow water, and
joint operations with other US services as well as allies will
become more and more common. The continuing spread of first-world
weapons to third-world countries that must be countered at close
range in a confused environment with restrictive rules of
engagement, will require new technologies and new techniques and
tactics.
Emphasis in this report is on platforms and weapons. It is
recognized that there are many other dimensions of a threat. Some
of these are technology, equipment quality, logistics support,
deployment, training, doctrine, leadership, morale, strategic and
tactical initiatives, political will etc. But these alone could
not pose a threat to US naval forces in blue water. Potential
adversaries would need platforms and weapons capable of sustained
operations at sea in sufficient numbers to challenge the firepower
of the US carrier battle group. It will be seen that the Soviet
Union is the only country with significant numbers of ocean-capable
forces. However, a closer look at the navies of other countries
shows significant firepower that can be brought to bear on US naval
ships operating close to shore. This has imporatant significance
for determining where efforts need to be focussed in both new
weapons and sensor systems as well as operational tactics.
Section 2 of this report shows in summary form the major
platforms and weapons of the Soviet Union, the erstwhile Warsaw
Pact, NATO, and the United States. Emphasis in this section is on
ocean-going vessels. Sections 3 through 6 show similar data for
subsaharan Africa, Latin America/Carribean, Asia/Australasia, and
Mideast/North Africa. Emphasis in these sections is on their
coastal capabilities, since as the reader will see, they have very
limited ocean-capable navies. In each section, platforms and
weapons are displaid by country and by submarine, ocean-going
surface ships, coastal vessels, and missiles. All data in this
report is taken from The Military Balance 1990-1991 (ref. [1]).
That document contains far more detail than is shown in this
report. The reader wishing to pursue a particular area in more
detail should consult that document, or references [2] or [5] for
more details available in the unclassified literature.
Section 7 contains the author's conclusions drawn from this
overview, and suggests areas for R&D emphasis that will be required
to meet the threats the Navy can be expected to face in the
littoral areas of the world in which it will find itself
increasingly operating.
2. The USA/USSR and Allied Navies.
This section contains a comparison of the major ocean-going
platforms of the US Navy and its NATO allies with those of the USSR
and its former Warsaw Pact allies. No attempt is made anywhere in
this report to do detailed comparisons by platform or weapons
capabilities. It is sufficient for the limited purposes of this
report to show orders of magnitude in order to point out potential
weaknesses in the US Navy capabilities where increased emphasis and
study are required.
Table 2-1 shows the numbers of various classes of submarines 1
held by the USA, USSR and their allies. The reader will see that
with the demise of the Warsaw Pact the USSR lost virtually none of
its submarine capability (not surprising perhaps since a number of
the Warsaw Pact counties are land-locked)
.
To be consistent with the data source (ref. [1]), the numbers
in the various tables in this report have not been altered to
reflect changing world situations. For example, the Warsaw Pact
!For readers not familiar with the standard terminology for
platforms and weapons, a list of the ones used in this report is
included in Appendix A. A complete list can be found in ref. [4].
COUNTRY SSBN SSGN SSN SSG S3
USA 34 13 77 1
USSR 63 46 68 14 114
NATO 10 12 115
W. FACT 8
Table 2-1. Submarines in the USA, USSR. NATO and Warsaw Pact,
was formally disestablished on 1 May, 1991, and the single US
conventional submarine was decomissioned in late 1990. It is
believed that that such changes will not invalidate the main
conclusions of the report.
Table 2-2 shows the numbers of various classes of ocean-
capable surface combatants. Again the reader can see that the USSR
lost little naval capability when the Warsaw Pact went out of
existence. The clear US superiority in naval air strike power is
indicated by the first two columns.
What we see from Tables 2-1 and 2-2 is the fact that in terms
of platforms the Soviet Navy continues to be a formidable force.
Since their ship building apparently continues unabated, this will
probably continue for some time. But in terms of a likely threat to
the US Fleet one must ask what purpose an attack on US naval forces
would serve if it is not part of some overall expansionist goal in
Europe, or other area contiguous to the USSR. It is not the
purpose of this report to try to evaluate this threat. Rather the
purpose is to illustrate that the US Navy, in addition to being
continually ready to counter this force, must also be prepared for
hostile activities instigated by far less capable countries when US












Table 2-2. Surface Ships in the USA, USSR, NATO and Warsaw Pact.
The next sections show the the overall size and structure of
the world's navies broken out by sovereign countries within
geographic areas as is done in reference [1]. No attempt has been
made to eliminate landlocked countries that can have no navy. The
reader will see that the ocean-going capabilities of most of the
navies is extremely limited, and in many cases are non-existent.
But when one looks at their coastal waters capability, especially
the proliferation of missiles and ever more capable conventional
submarines, it can be seen that some of these countries could pose
a significant threat to US naval operations that will require new
sensors, weapons, platforms and tactics.
3. Sub-Saharan Africa.
The submarine and ocean-going surface ships of the many
countries that constitute sub-Saharan Africa are shown in Table
3-1. The only submarines are three French Dauphines belonging to
South Africa.
Table 3-2 shows the numbers and classes of coastal vessels of
the various countries in this region, and Table 3-3 shows the
existence of the four classes of missiles (surface-to-surface,
air-to-surface, air-to-air, and surface-to-air) . Since specific
numbers of these weapons are difficult to verify, asterisks show
which countries are in possession of which type.
Recent events have resulted in US naval operations off the
African coast at Liberia in the removal of US nationals. More will
be said later in this report about this type of limited obective








































Table 3-1. Submarines and Surface Ships in Sub-Saharan Africa
COUNTRY CORVETTE8 MISSILE TORPEDO PATROL MINE







































Table 3-2. Coastal Vessels in Sub-Saharan Africa.
COUNTRY SSM ASM AAM SAM




































ZAMBIA * . *
ZIMBABWE *
Table 3-3. Missiles in Sub-Saharan Africa.
24. Latin America and the Caribbean.
Table 4-1 shows the submarines in Latin America2 by class.



























4-1. Latin American Submarines.
Although the conventional submarines in this part of the
world pose a limited threat far from shore, they can form a serious
threat close to shore as was demonstrated in the Falklands
conflict. This table illustrates an important point made in this
report. By scanning the columns one can see that many coutries
possess the same class of submarine. Modern conventional
2 In this section we use the term Latin America to include all
countries in South and Central America.
10
submarines are not only difficult to detect with current methods,
but will cause a serious classification problem. If you detect a
209 class, to which country does it belong? The tables showing
these conventional submarines may well be out of date when this
report comes out. As is reported in reference [3], the sale of
modern highly capable conventional submarines is a worldwide growth
industry.
COUNTRY CW CC DP FF


























4-2. Latin America Surface Ships.
Table 4-2 shows the ocean-capable surface ships in this area of the
world. Both Argentina and Brazil possess small carriers that can
provide limited air support.
11
Table 4-3 shows the coastal vessels. National shoreline
protection is clearly the emphasis for countries' naval operations
in this part of the world.
COUNTRY CORVETTES MISSILE TORPEDO PATROL MINE C/M
CRAFT CRAFT



























Table 4-3. Latin American Coastal Vessels.
Table 4-4 shows the types of missiles possessed by the various
countries. Again one can see a proliferation of modern weapons
that could pose a serious threat to naval vessels close to shore.
12
COUNTRY SSM ASM AAM SAM




BRAZIL * * *
CHILE * * * *
COLOMBIA * *
COSTA RICA
CUBA * * * *
DOM. REP.















VENEZUELA * * *
Table 4-4. Latin Amercan Missiles.
The conclusion one can draw from the tables in this section is
that, although the Latin American countries have some ocean-capable
vessels, they would pose little threat to the US Navy far from
shore. But a US Navy presence projecting power close to the shore
of many Latin American countries could find a significant threat,
especially in an environment where the sinking or disabling of a
single US warship could have serious political ramifications.
5. Asia and Australasia.
Table 5-1 shows the very signiicant numbers of submarines in
the Asian countries (less the USSR). These include one strategic
and four attack nuclear submarines belonging to China, and one
13



































Table 5.1. Asian Submarines
It should be noted that 84 of the 87 Chinese conventional
submarines are Romeos, many of which are believed to be non-
operational.
Table 5.2 shows the surface vessels. The reader can see that
the overwhelming majority of platforms are frigates, with
significant numbers in Japan, China, South Korea, India, and
Taiwan. A comparison of North and South Koreas shows the heavy
emphasis on submarines in the North (24 to 3) , and the heavy
emphasis on surface ships in the South (3 to 34)
.
14



























Table 5.2. Asia Surface Ships.
Table 5.3 shows the coastal vessels of the various Asian
countries. China and North Korea both have large numbers of patrol,
torpedo, and missile craft. These three coutries and Japan have
large numbers of mine and mine countermeasure craft.
15














































































Table 5.3. Asia Coastal Vessels.
Table 5.4 shows the proliferation of missiles in the Asian
countries. Some 8 countries have air-to-surface capability, and 16
have surface-to-surface. Almost all countties have air-to-air
and/or surface-to-air missiles.
16
COUNTRY SSM ASM AAM SAM





CHINA * * * *
INDIA * * * *
INDONESIA * *
JAPAN * * * *
N.KOREA * * *
S.KOREA * * * *
LAOS * *
MALAYSIA * * *
MONGOLIA *
NEPAL
PAKISTAN * * * *
PAPUA N.GUINEA
PHILLIPINES *
SINGAPORE * * *
SRI LANKA
TAIWAN * * * *
THAILAND * * *
VIETNAM * * *
AUSTRALIA * * * *
FIJI
NEW ZEALAND * * *
Table 5.4. Asia Missiles.
It is clear that the naval capabilities in many Asian
countries exceed those of most in Latin America and all those in
sub-saharan Africa. The US Navy could face signicant resistance
off the shores of these countries, although it is still difficult
to see any deep ocean, blue water threat that could not be defended
against with the current US forces.
6. Mideast and North Africa.
We now turn to the final and one of the most troubled areas of
the world involving vital US interests, the countries bordering on
the Mediterranean and the oil states. Table 6.1 shows the
17
submarines in this part of the world broken out by class (all
Soviet) . Notice that neither Iraq nor Iran has a submarine. It is
the author's contention that had either one had an operable
undetected conventional submarine, especially of the modern type
such as a German 209, the role of the US Navy in Desert Shield and
Desert Storm would have been significantly different. Operating
carriers in areas as restricted as the Persian Gulf in support of
limited objectives would probably be considered to have an




























Table 6.1. Mid-East and North Africa Submarines.
Table 6.2 shows the surface ships in the mid-east and north
African countries. Although ocean capable, they are mostly
operated close to their home base. Table 6.3 shows the coastal
18























Table 6.2. Mid-East and North African Surface Ships.
Table 6.4 shows that virtually all countries in this region
possess all four classes of missiles. Table 6.5 shows a breakout
of the surface-to-surface missiles by make or classification. Not
only are missiles of all types available in most countries, many
countries are armed with the same or similar models. One can see
that the surface-surface version of the French Exocet is present in
seven countries, the Soviet Styx in seven, US Harpoons in four etc.
Many of these countries are either direct neighbors or in close
proximity. With short reaction time due to missile speeds and
sizes of countries in the area, there is a critical need for new

































Table 6.3. Mid-East and North Africa Coastal Vessels.
Table 6.6 shows selected types of fighter/ground attack
(FGA's) aircraft in the various countries in the region. These
numbers were current prior to the Desert Storm conflict. Again one
can see the proliferation of given makes and models. In Desert
Storm, the allied French airforce flew only about one percent of
the combat missions against Iraq. This was in large part due to
the identification problem and the concern to avoid blue casualties
caused by blue fire.
20
COUNTRY SSM ASM AAM SAM
ALGERIA * * *
BAHRAIN * * * *
EGYPT * * * *
IRAN * * * *
IRAQ * * * *
ISRAEL * * * *
JORDAN * * *
KUWAIT * * * *
LEBANON * *
LIBYA * * * *
MORROCO * * * *
OMAN * * * *
QATAR * * *
SAUDI ARABIA * * * *
SOMALI * * *
SUDAN * *
SYRIA * * * *
TUNISIA * * *
UAE * * * *
YEMEN * * * *
Table 6.4. Mid-East and North Africa Missilees •
Table 6.7 shows selected air-to-surface missiles in this








































































































































Table 6.7. Air-to Surface Missiles in the Mid-East/North Africa
Region
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7. Future US Naval Operational Problems
Although it is not possible to predict with any certainty the
future locations and situations in which the US Navy will be
required to operate, it is possible to draw some conclusions from
the above overview and the current world situation. With the
decline of the stable bipolar world we are seeing ever increasing
local conflicts as traditional ethnic and religious rivalries are
unleashed. As long as the Soviet Navy continues to operate its
strategic forces it will remain a major concern to our Navy. But
we can expect that the well publicised problems internal to the
USSR, including its continual existence, will be a major
preoccupation for them for the foreseeable future. While our Navy
must continue to be able to counter any threat that they can mount,
it must also be better prepared to respond in support of US
national interests wherever a threat occurs. The question is, what
if anything can we learn from the above overview of the world's
navies?
The first observation to make is that there is currently a
very low level of threat to our surface fleet and sea lanes of
communication (SLOCS) from non-soviet forces on the open oceans.
This could change if the proliferation of highly capable
conventional submarines continues as Benedict points out in refence
[3]. But future conflicts are far more likely to occur off the
coasts of certain countries; recent examples include Lebanon,
Liberia, Libya, and the Persian Gulf /Red Sea. The major common
characteristics of such operations are i) limited and often
difficult rules of engagement, ii) shallow water operations, iii)
non-belligerent parties and vessels present,
24
iv) the opponent will possess high technology weapons, v) their
will be little domestic tolerance for even small numbers of US
casualties, vi) engagements are likely to be at close range with
very limited battle space, and vii) more amphibious support
operations as well as joint service operations. The implications
of each of these are discussed below.
i) Rules of Engagement . In the type of naval operation envisaged,
it is highly unlikely that war will have been declared against the
USA. We can expect more "incidents" like the USS Stark attack, or
the perceived threat to the Vincennes. We need to review
technologies, strategies and tactics that can be of more help than
we have in the fleet today. It is unlikely that we will be in a
position to instigate offensive operations; it is much more likely
that we will be in a responding mode, and then only when a serious
threat is already under way.
ii) Shallow Water Operations . The Navy's concentration of effort
has clearly been on combat in deep water. Our navy is structured
as a "blue water" navy. But the littoral areas pose significantly
different threats. Mine warfare clearly becomes far more
important. So does the threat from land-based air and missiles.
As was seen in earlier sections, many countries off which US ships
are likely to be called to operate possess significant numbers of
missile and/or torpedo boats. Some possess highly capable
conventional submarines. While these may not be a significant
threat to our fleet in the oceans because of their limited speed
and endurance, they could cause serious problems in shallow water.
Our own submarine force would rather avoid shallow water. Not only
is their room to maneuver limited, their acoustic detection methods
25
are seriously degraded. So are the acoustic systems on surface
ships. Couple this with the quietness of modern conventional
submarines possessed by third world countries and we see a vital
need for improved ASW methods in shallow water. We need also to
put much greater effort into mining and mine countermeasures. With
increasing likelihood of the Navy Marine Corps undertaking
amphibious operations, the priority for being able to counter
sophisticated modern mines has increased substantially.
iii) Presence of Non-belligerents . We have developed
classification systems and weapons systems for ocean operations
that will either be of little help in coastal regions or highly
inappropriate. For example, while the land-attack version of the
Tomahawk missile was extemely successful in Desert Storm, the sea-
attack version was found to be of limited use. The political
consequences of sinking or seriously damaging a third party warship
(a Soviet, French, British, Egyptian, ..?) vessel in the gulf by a
US missile could be destabilising rather than just embarrassing.
The consequences of causing serious casualties aboard a non-warship
could be even worse. Because of the rules of engagement it is
highly unlikely that a zone of belligerency could be declared to
help alleviate the problem.
iv) High Technology Weapons . Whereas our navy faces high tech
weapons on the ocean, they have room to operate with a layered
defense over long ranges. But close in to shore the long range
systems will be of limited use. The exocets that hit the USS Stark
are an example. We have shown that the majority of countries now
possess these weapons, and it is highly unlikely, given the profits
to be made, the instability in the world, and the difficulty of
26
monitoring arms shipments, that proliferation will be curtailed or
even kept at its current level. Better and faster classification
and response systems are called for to counter such weapons as well
as to obtain better timely intelligence through scouting,
v) Little Tolerence for Casualties . The US public may have
considerable tolerence for US casualties when its independence is
threatened by a global power such as the USSR. But the Navy must
be prepared for a world in which public opinion will often side
with the perceived underdog, and that even modest damage to a US
warship could be heralded as a victory by them, and at the same
time seen as an unacceptable embarrassment by the US government,
vi) Close-in Hostile Engagements . The ranges over which conflicts
will occur will be much shorter than those for which our weapons
systems and platforms are designed and for which our people are
trained. This has already been alluded to above. We will probably
have to rethink the configuration of systems and our training
programs and tactics. At the same time we need to re-emphasise
work that can lead to improved close-in systems. Sea Sparrow and
Phalanx may have been adequate as a third and final level of
defense to stop small numbers of leakers. They were never intended
to be the whole answer to short range attacks.
vii) Amphibious and Joint Operations . Naval actions close to shore
may be shows of force, but are much more likely to be part of some
Marine amphibious operation (such as the recent extraction of US
nationals from Liberia) or limited objective joint-service
operation (such as Grenada and Panama) . There will be a much
greater need for interservice communication and operation.
27
When one considers the above seven characteristics as a
whole,
one can see some reasonably clear directions for further
research
and development to respond to the future Navy roles.
There is a
clear need for better technologies for identification
and
classification, mine countermeasures, close-in missile
defense,
non-acoustic ASW to mention just a few. It is hoped that the
contents of this report will stir interest and debate at
NPS as to
how our academic and research programs can be changed
to better
support the changing roles of the Navy.
28
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APPENDIX: ACRONYMS FOR PLATFFORMS AND WEAPONS
SUBMARINES.
SSBN Ballistic Missile Nuclear Powered Submarine
SSN Nuclear Powered Attack Submarine
SSGN Guided Missile Firing SSN
SS Attack Submarine
SSG Guided Missile Firing SS
SURFACE SHIPS.
CV Aircraft Carrier
CVN Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier
CW VSTOL and Helicopter Carrier
BB Battle Ship
CC Cruiser
CG Guided Missile Firing CC
CGN Nuclear Powered CG
DD Destroyer
DDG Guided Missile Firing DD
FF Frigate
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